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Abstract
Current account imbalances and their sustainability are among the most debated 
international policy issues. Through the recently designed External Balance Assessment 
methodology (EBA), the IMF estimates the impact of several countries’ fundamentals and 
policies on their current account balance, calculates misalignments in their current account 
position and indicates policy recommendations which, if implemented, should contribute to 
reducing these imbalances.
In this paper, we explore some extensions to the EBA, following two courses. First, we 
distinguish in current account regressions between countries that are considered safe 
investment destinations and non-safe economies. Since this distinction is likely to acquire 
special relevance in periods of global turmoil, we also distinguish between periods of 
global stress and tranquil times. Second, we embed in EBA regressions variables that drive 
countries’ external competitiveness.
Results show that current account dynamics may be affected by competitiveness factors and 
differ signifi cantly between safe and non-safe economies, with such differences becoming 
particularly relevant in turbulent times. These fi ndings suggest that EBA regressions may 
be overlooking the infl uence of countries’ safety and competitiveness on external balances. 
Our alternative misalignment estimations show larger imbalances than those calculated 
with the EBA for some Asian economies and smaller imbalances for some high-surplus EU 
countries.
Keywords: current account, current account benchmark, global imbalances, external 
balance assessment.
JEL classifi cation: F3, F32, F4, F6.
Resumen
Los desequilibrios del saldo por cuenta corriente y su sostenibilidad están entre los temas 
de política internacional más debatidos. Mediante una metodología recientemente diseñada 
—external balance assessment (EBA)—, el FMI estima el impacto sobre el saldo por cuenta 
corriente de sus principales determinantes y de las políticas adoptadas en cada país, 
calcula el desequilibrio en su saldo exterior e indica recomendaciones de política que, de 
aplicarse, deberían contribuir a reducir estos desequilibrios.
En este artículo se analizan algunas extensiones a la EBA, siguiendo dos líneas. En primer 
lugar, en las regresiones se contempla la posibilidad de que el efecto de las variables sobre 
el saldo por cuenta corriente sea diferente en los países que se consideran destinos seguros 
de inversión en relación con el efecto en economías no seguras. Dado que esta distinción es 
probable que adquiera especial relevancia en períodos de crisis global, también se distingue 
entre períodos de estrés global y tiempos tranquilos. En segundo lugar, se incorporan a las 
regresiones de la EBA variables que impulsan la competitividad externa de los países.
Los resultados muestran que el saldo por cuenta corriente se ve afectado por factores de 
competitividad, y responde de manera signifi cativamente distinta en economías seguras y 
no seguras —diferencias que adquieren especial relevancia en momentos de turbulencias 
fi nancieras—. Estos resultados sugieren que, entre los aspectos no contemplados en las 
regresiones de la EBA, el carácter más o menos seguro de las economías o aspectos 
determinantes de la competitividad son factores relevantes que afectan al saldo exterior de 
los países. Las estimaciones alternativas de los desequilibrios por cuenta corriente indican 
que estos son mayores que los calculados por la EBA en algunas economías asiáticas y son 
más pequeños en varios países de la UE con alto superávit.
Palabras clave: cuenta corriente, saldo óptimo del saldo por cuenta corriente, desequilibrios 
globales, external balance assessment.
Códigos JEL: F3, F32, F4, F6.
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1 Introduction
Current account imbalances and their sustainability are among the most debated international
policy issues. After having increased steadily during the Nineties, current account divergences across
countries experienced only a temporary reduction after the outburst of the global crisis. Indeed, the
last three years have witnessed a new widening in current account gaps between surplus and deficit
countries at the world level. In principle, current account divergencies may be appropriate if they
arise as a consequence of differences in countries’ level of development, demographic factors or other
structural characteristics. However, if they are not coherent with economic fundamentals, current
account divergencies can pose an important threat to global stability and sustainable growth.
While unsustainable external deficits may be subject to the risk of sudden reversals, the excessive
surpluses that were accumulated by some economies in the years that preceded the crisis might
have contributed to the creation of global vulnerabilities. In the face of these risks, it seems crucial
to develop analytical methodologies to estimate the size of current account misalignments —the
gaps between observed current accounts and the value consistent with fundamentals and optimal
policies— and to indicate the policy prescriptions that can contribute to reduce them.
Among the recent advances in this field, are the methods elaborated by the IMF Consultative
Group on Exchange Rates (Lee et al. [2008]), the methodological advances proposed by Bussiere
et al. (2010), and the most recent External Balance Assessment (EBA) method, developed by the
International Monetary Fund and described in the External Sector Report (IMF [2012]). These
methodologies represent important policy tools. Indeed, the analyses of misalignments they allow
to conduct serve as crucial inputs for the wider assessments of countries’ external positions that
are periodically published by the IMF, and for multilateral supervision mechanisms, such as the
Mutual Assessment Process of the economies belonging to the G-20.
All these methods consist in regressing countries’ current account balances on a wide set of
fundamental drivers. These can vary across methodologies but generally include some structural
determinants (per capita income, population growth), cyclical factors (the output gap) and policy
variables (fiscal balance, capital controls). From this exercise, the "desirable" level of current
account balances is computed —the one that would be consistent with structural and cyclical factors
and with optimal policies.1 The difference between the current account balance observed in a given
year and its desirable value constitutes the current account misalignment.
These methods represent important advances in the estimation of external imbalances. While
their regression frameworks allow to base policy advice on rigorous econometric estimates, their mul-
tilateral perspective makes it possible to provide policy recommendations to individual economies,
having taken into account their global spillovers.
1The External Balance Assessment methodology uses specific rules to determine “optimal” policies for each coun-
try. The other methods instead assume that the policy variables included in current account regressions are at their
optimal level.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 8 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1401
Yet, the economic literature suggests that several factors that are still scarcely embedded in
standard methods may be important drivers of current account dynamics. First, financial aspects
related to the supply and demand of safe assets may play a crucial role in determining external
positions. Indeed, an important body of literature suggests that the ability of different countries to
supply sound financial assets to savers may have a relevant impact on external balances.2 As the
experience of the United States has shown, countries that are considered issuers of safe assets by
international investors can sustain large external deficits for long periods. Their current account
dynamics may be less dependent on changes in macroeconomic fundamentals or on cyclical demand
factors, and it may be easier for them to borrow from abroad in order to finance their expansionary
policies. Arguably, differences between safe and non-safe countries are likely to be exacerbated in
periods of global turmoil, when risk aversion and the demand for safe assets typically increase.
A second set of factors that the literature suggests to be among the drivers of current account
dynamics but that are scarcely represented in standard methods, are variables reflecting external
competitiveness. Factors like R&D, human capital, labor skills, product and labor market flexibility
may be crucial in lowering firms’ production costs, improve the quality of their products and their
market power, and may ultimately have a significant impact on their capacity to service the internal
market and to export successfully in the international one. Firms’ competitiveness, in turn, may
boost a country’s trade balance and ultimately affect its current account dynamics.3
In this paper, we explore two extensions to standard methods, following precisely these two lines.
We take as a benchmark the most recent and advanced tool to detect misalignments, the External
Balance Assessment methodology (EBA henceforth), developed by the IMF and described in the
External Sector Report (IMF [2012]).4 Our first extension concerns the role of financial aspects
related to the supply and demand of safe assets. Starting from the EBA baseline, we distinguish
in current account regressions between countries that are considered safe investment destinations
and non-safe economies, based on Standard and Poor’s ratings. Since this distinction is likely to
acquire special relevance in periods of global turmoil, when risk-aversion typically increases, we also
distinguish between periods of global stress and tranquil times. As a consequence, contrary to the
EBA, in our extended framework the impact of all determinants of the current account —countries’
fundamentals, cyclical factors and policies— is allowed to differ between safe and non-safe countries,
and in crisis periods.
Our second extension concerns the role of competitiveness drivers. We embed in the EBA
specification two factors that can affect countries’ external competitiveness, namely technological
progress and human capital. In particular, we build a proxy for the level of education using data on
2See, among the others, Caballero et al. (2008). See also Mendoza et al. (2009) for a model in which the
equilibrium in the international market for safe assets plays a crucial role in shaping countries’ external positions.
3See, for instance, Altomonte et al. (2012). Dieppe et al. (2012) show that competitiveness drivers have been
among the main determinants of EU countries’ export performance in the last years.
4With respect to previous methods, the EBA considers a wider set of potential drivers of the current account,
which includes some financial factors and capital account drivers. Contrary to other methodologies, it also allows to
ascribe estimated current account misalignments to specific policy distortions.
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educational attainment from Barro and Lee (2010), and use Total Factor Productivity as a proxy
for technological progress.
The purpose of these extensions is twofold. First, to study if countries’ safety and competitive-
ness significantly influence current account dynamics, even controlling for all the other potential
drivers of external balances that are already reflected in standard methods. This analysis will
indicate whether these methods may be overlooking the impact of some relevant determinants of
current account positions, like countries’ safety and competitiveness may be. Second, these ex-
tensions let us investigate if taking into account the influence of safety and competitiveness on
external dynamics changes the estimated misalignments. This will give some indication on whether
the imbalances detected through the EBA are robust to a possible inclusion of these factors.
Regression results confirm the hypothesis that the impact of various determinants of external
balances differs depending on whether the country is perceived as a safe investment destination,
and that these differences tend to acquire special relevance in turbulent times.
In tranquil times, a fiscal deficit tends to generate a current account deficit, consistently with
the so-called twin deficit hypothesis. In turbulent times, a fiscal expansion translates into a lower
external deficit for countries that are not perceived as safe investment destinations, signaling a
reduction in the availability of external financing. Safe economies, on the other hand, do not seem
to be subject to the same restrictions.
In stable times, cyclical increases in demand tend to generate current account deficits. During
crises, this effect is stronger for non-safe economies. This could be due to the fact that non-safe
countries tend to be subject to financial retrenchment in periods of global turbulence. The absence
of external financing, in turn, may contribute to make their external balances more dependent
on internal demand shocks. The opposite holds for safe economies, which tend to receive capital
inflows in crises times due precisely to their characteristics of safe assets producers, so that their
current account fluctuations end up being less dependent on demand factors.
We find that the capacity of safe countries to attract investment is less dependent on expected
GDP growth. Also, economies that were not considered by investors as safe investment destinations
but ended up adopting a currency that was used for reserve purposes —Portugal and Greece in our
sample— could somehow increase their credibility due to the international status of their currency,
and were able to sustain higher external deficits.
Some of our results are arguably due to the different degree of development of safe economies
—by and large industrialized countries— and non-safe ones —typically emerging markets. In safe
industrialized countries the current account balance is much more affected by the aging speed,
due to the higher average age of the population, which requires higher savings. Increases in social
protection tend to lower precautionary savings and reduce external surpluses. We find that this
effect is more pronounced in non-safe economies, generally developing countries characterized by a
scarce safety net.
As for competitiveness drivers, we find that both the stock of human capital and technolog-
ical progress are significant determinants of current account balances, although their estimated
coefficients are rather small.
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Our extensions improve the overall fit of the econometric model with respect to the EBA
baseline. Namely, the adjusted R-squared of our extended specification is 9% higher than the one
delivered by the EBA specification.5
We then turn to studying whether taking into account the influence of safety and competitiveness
on external dynamics changes the estimated current account misalignments. To this aim, we
use the regression coefficients estimated with our extended specification to compute alternative
misalignments for the year 2011. In particular we calculate a first measure of imbalances, which
we term "policy misalignment", using the distortions due to the four policy variables considered
by the EBA plus the regression residual. This measure is directly comparable to the imbalances
estimated by the IMF. Through it, we estimate larger misalignments than those computed through
the EBA for some Asian economies —China, Malaysia—, because of larger distortions in their social
protection and reserves accumulation policy. Some advanced countries, like Japan, are estimated
to have a larger excessive deficit with respect to the one indicated by the IMF, due mainly to
a more pronounced distortion caused by their loose fiscal policy. On the other hand, we detect
smaller imbalances for high-surplus economies like Germany, Switzerland and the Netherlands,
due to a reduction in the regression residual for the year 2011. A higher share of these excessive
surpluses is estimated to be caused by the fiscal excesses detected in other countries. Also, our
results indicate that the generous health policy implemented in France is not a significant cause of
external imbalances, contrary to what is estimated through the EBA.
We exploit the presence of competitiveness drivers to estimate additional current account mis-
alignments due to more structural factors. These additional imbalances, which we name "structural
misalignments" reflect only distortions created by a low progress in education and technology adop-
tion, and have no equivalent in the EBA analysis. We find that distortions due to an excessively low
TFP growth are generally small. Only for Japan they seem to acquire special relevance, consistently
with the notion that TFP growth has lagged behind in this country during its "lost decade". On
the other hand, several developing countries exhibit significant external imbalances due to an insuf-
ficient level of high education. Among industrialized countries, this issue seems to be particularly
relevant for Italy and France.
This paper is related to two main strands of literature. First, contributions dealing with the
estimation of equilibrium current account norms and external imbalances. Beyond the IMF research
on the topic (Lee et al. [2008], IMF [2012] and IMF [2013]), Bussiere et al.(2010) propose the use
of Bayesian averaging techniques to address problems due to model uncertainty in the estimation
of current account regressions. De Santis et al. (2011) suggest the use of an alternative weighting
scheme to build country-specific world averages. Our work focuses instead on extending standard
specifications by distinguishing between safe and non-safe economies, crisis periods and tranquil
times, and by introducing factors affecting countries’ external competitiveness.
5These modifications are particularly useful to reduce the very large residuals that the EBA yields for some
countries, although in some cases this improved fit comes at the expenses of a worse match for other economies.
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The second body of studies to which this paper is related is the vast literature that studies
the determinants of current account balances. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first
to study how the impact of all the determinants of the current account varies between economies
perceived to be safe by international markets participants, and those regarded as non-safe countries.
Previous works, such as Lee et al. (2008) and Gruber and Kamin (2007), incorporated dummies for
banking crises and the Asian financial turmoil in current account regressions in order to control for
shifts in the intercept. We study, instead, how the impact of various current account determinants
differs in periods of global turmoil, depending on whether countries are considered to be safe by
international investors.
Some of our results highlight the importance of countries’ level of development for their external
position. Chinn and Prasad (2003) and Medina et al. (2010) are among the few papers in the
literature that study this issue by running separate regressions for industrialized and developing
countries, generally finding significant differences in the coefficients of net foreign assets and the
fiscal balance. We investigate the same issue in the more complete regression framework established
by the EBA. Its richer interactions and dynamics allow to uncover additional interesting differences
among industrialized and developing countries that are not emphasized in previous works.
Several papers studied the impact of competitiveness factors on external balances. Gruber
and Kamin (2007) consider the impact of institutional quality on external dynamics, Lanau and
Wieladek (2012) the effects of financial regulation. We focus instead on the effects of educational
attainment and technological progress. Educational issues are investigated in Chinn and Prasad
(2000). They use average years of schooling as a proxy for human capital, which leads them to
capture effects of the educational level that are partly different from competitiveness matters, and
leads to different results.6 Lommantzsch (2011), Dieppe et al. (2012) and Estrada et al. (2013)
study the impact of a wide series of competitiveness factors, including technology and R&D, on
trade balances and export performance but unlike ours their analysis is restricted to EU countries.
The next Section provides a description of the EBA. Section 3 presents the results of extending
the EBA specification by distinguishing between safe and non-safe countries, and between crisis
periods and tranquil times. Section 4 introduces variables reflecting countries’ competitiveness,
while Section 5 shows alternative estimates of current account misalignments computed using our
extended specification, and compares them with those presented in the IMF External Sector Report
(2012). We draw some conclusions in Section 6.
2 The IMF External Balance Assessment methodology
The purpose of the External Balance Assessment methodology (EBA), presented in the IMF Ex-
ternal Sector Report (2012), is to provide an estimation of Current Account (CA) imbalances,
6See Section 4 for more details.
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defined as misalignments of cyclically-adjusted current account with respect to values consistent
with fundamentals and desirable policies.7
In particular, the EBA is a regression-based method that consists of: (i) estimating the re-
lationship between the CA and several macro variables; (ii) computing the misalignments with
respect to the value that would be consistent with fundamentals and desirable policies; and (iii)
attributing these imbalances to different policy distortions. In a first step the CA is regressed on
three sets of variables. A first group of regressors reflects structural characteristics of the economy,
which may affect the desirable current account balance. In the first version of the EBA these are
population growth, the old-age dependency ratio, aging speed, per capita income relative to the
US (as a proxy for the level of development), net foreign assets to GDP, the oil balance (only for
countries for which this variable exceeds 10% of GDP), expected GDP growth, own currency share
in world reserves, and a dummy that indicates if the country is a financial center. A second set
of variables, reflecting cyclical factors, comprises the output gap, the commodity terms of trade
gap, and the VIX index of financial market volatility as a proxy for global risk aversion. The third
group of regressors consists of four policy variables, namely the cyclically adjusted fiscal balance,
public health spending (a proxy for the level of social protection), the Quinn capital control index,
and the change in international reserves. All variables, with the exception of net foreign assets, are
expressed relative to a GDP-weighted world aggregate. The CA equations are panel estimated for
50 advanced and emerging market economies, using data from 1986 to 2010.
In a second step, the normative benchmark values for the four policy variables are specified. In
particular, the recommended level of cyclically-adjusted fiscal balance is provided by IMF country
desks. The benchmark for public health spending is obtained from a regression of such spending
(as a share of GDP) on countries’ GDP per capita and their demographics. For capital controls
the benchmark is either the cross-country average level of the capital control index or their actual
level, if smaller. Finally, for the change in international reserves, the approach is to presume that
the change observed in 2011 was appropriate, unless the level of reserves is far in excess of the IMF
Reserve Adequacy metric. Policy distortions ("policy gaps" in the EBA terminology) are defined
as the difference between observed policies and policy benchmarks. The contribution of each policy
gap to CA imbalances is computed by multiplying the relevant regression coefficients estimated in
the first step by the corresponding policy gaps. The Total Current Account Gap is computed as the
sum of all policy gaps and the regression residual. The Total Current Account Gap constitutes an
estimation of the Current Account misalignment, as it measures the deviation of the CA balance
observed in a given year from the level that would be consistent with the structural characteristics
of the economy, the economic cycle and desirable policies. The CA gaps estimated through the
EBA are then considered as inputs, among other indicators, of the broader IMF assessment of
8See IMF (2012) for further details on the methodology and the broader assessment of countries’ current accounts.
countries’ external balances that is published in the IMF External Sector Reports.8
7Other goals of the EBA are the estimation of real exchange rate misalignments and the assessment of countries’
external positions sustainability. While the real exchange rate analysis is performed through a regression-based
approach similar to the analysis of current account misalignments, the external sustainability assessment consists
in evaluating whether the current account projected for the medium term stabilizes a country’s net foreign assets
position at a benchmark level. See IMF (2012) for a detailed description of these methods.
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The EBA constitutes a significant attempt to refine the methodology of misalignment estima-
tion developed in 2008 by the CGER, the Consultative Group on Exchange Rates.9 Indeed, CGER
methods do not aim at identifying the impact on external imbalances of specific policies. In this
sense, the EBA seems a more ambitious and useful methodology, as it allows for country-specific
policy recommendations that may serve to reduce external imbalances and distortions in the global
allocation. Moreover, while the CGER specification does not take into account among the potential
determinants of external balances any financial factors, the EBA includes a measure of capital con-
trols policy, an indicator of foreign exchange interventions, an index of financial market conditions
and the share of a country’s currency held as international reserves.10
Yet, some factors that are suggested to be important drivers of CA dynamics may be, at the mo-
ment, scarcely reflected in the EBA analysis. Among these, financial aspects related to the supply
and demand of safe assets. The idea that safe economies might display different CA dynamics than
non-safe countries, and that these differences might get more pronounced in times of global stress,
is only partially reflected in the EBA. In particular, this framework includes among the potential
drivers of external dynamics the share of a country’s currency that is held worldwide as foreign
exchange reserves. That share is also interacted with the VIX index of financial market volatility.
As a consequence, countries that issue safe heaven currencies (the US, Switzerland, Japan and
Euro Area members) are allowed to run higher deficits in tranquil times, and to display even more
negative external balances when global financial shocks hit. However, there are reasons to believe
that these effects might not be the only ones that are induced by the ability of a country to issue
safe assets. First, while countries that issue safe heaven currencies might enjoy a privileged status,
this definition of safety might turn out to be restrictive in some cases, since, as it is apparent when
looking at country ratings, also economies whose currencies are not used as international reserves
might offer safe investment opportunities. Second, the impact of safety perception on the current
account might go beyond the ability of a safe country to run higher deficits. Indeed, the current
account dynamics of safe countries may be less dependent on changes in their fundamentals or on
cyclical demand factors, and it may be easier for them to borrow from abroad in order to finance
their expansionary policies. In this sense, it may be that the impact of traditional determinants
of the current account —fundamentals, cyclical factors, policy variables— differs between safe and
non-safe countries, and that these differences get more pronounced in periods of global stress.
A second set of factors that may be important drivers of CA dynamics but are not embedded
in the EBA, are those that may affect a country’s international competitiveness —technological
progress, human capital, financial market regulation, and labor market flexibility, among the others.
These considerations lead us to explore two extensions to the EBA. We take as a benchmark the
baseline approach used in the first version of this method.11 One extension consists in embedding
9See Lee et al. (2008).
10The second version of the EBA, described in IMF (2013), includes also a measure of excesses in private credit.
11 In future research we will extend the analysis to the newly-released second version of that method.
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in the baseline regression variables capturing structural factors that may impact countries’ compet-
itiveness, namely technological progress and human capital. As a second extension, we distinguish
in current account regressions between countries that are considered safe investment destinations
and non-safe economies, based on Standard and Poor’s ratings. Since this distinction is likely to
acquire special relevance in periods of global turmoil, when risk-aversion typically increases, we
also distinguish between periods of global stress and tranquil times. These modifications extend
the potential role of countries’ safety with respect to the EBA, in two respects. First, our notion of
safe country is more comprehensive, as it goes beyond those economies whose currencies are used
for reserve purposes. Second, and most importantly, we let the impact of all determinants of the
CA differ between safe and non-safe countries, and in crisis periods. This allows considering in a
more complete way how the ability of a country to issue safe assets can influence its current account
dynamics, and to assess whether safety aspects get more relevant in periods of global crisis.
The main question we address using our extended specification is whether countries’ safety and
competitiveness significantly influence CA dynamics, even controlling for all the other potential
drivers of external balances that are already reflected in the EBA. A related issue is whether these
extensions lower the residuals delivered by the EBA framework. Indeed, as emphasized in IMF
(2012), EBA regressions yield very large residuals for some countries. Since regression residuals
add to the measure of external imbalances, the presence of large residuals might complicate the
interpretation of the estimated misalignments. In particular, residuals may be interpreted by IMF
analysts as reflecting distortions due to policy variables that are not included in the regression —for
instance, inefficiencies in product or labor markets or in regulatory macroprudential policies. In
that case, part of the estimated misalignment ends up being attributed to unobserved policy factors
that are not embedded in the econometric framework .12 Using our extended specification we also
investigate whether a possible inclusion of safety and competitiveness aspects might be useful to
lower regression residuals.
The next two sections present the regression exercises in detail and discuss the most important
results.
3 Current account dynamics for safe and non-safe countries
3.1 Identifying safe economies and global crisis periods
The identification of safe economies is based on the Standard and Poor’s foreign long-term rating of
sovereign bonds. In particular, we consider a country to be an issuer of safe assets when it exhibits
a rating of AA or above for more than half the years in the sample.13 According to this criterion,
12For instance, in the External Sector Report (2012) it is recommended that peripheral EU countries implement
"structural reforms to improve the efficiency of labor and product markets". Since no variable representing these
factors is included in the econometric specification, these recommendations are necessarily based on IMF analysts’
interpretation of regression residuals.
13According to the Standard and Poor’s classification, countries are assigned an AA rating if they show a "very
strong capacity to meet financial commitments". The time sample is the same as the one considered in the EBA CA
regression (1986-2010).
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the economies identified as safe are a subset of industrialized countries. Namely, we consider to be
producers of safe assets Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Singapore, Spain, Switzerland, Sweden,
the UK and the US.14
Following Calvo et al. (2008) and Alberola et al. (2012), we identify years of global stress
through fluctuations in the index VIX/VXO of financial market volatility. Namely, we consider
years of global turmoil those in which this index jumps more than three standard deviations over
its two-quarter moving average. From these episodes, we exclude those in which the VIX is below
its full-sample average. The results of this exercise are shown in Figure 1. According to this
criterion, we classify as years of global turmoil 1987-1988 ("Black Monday" stock market crash
and US Savings & Loans corporations crisis), 1990 (banking crises in Italy, Norway and Brazil),
1997-1998 (financial crises in emerging Asia and Russia), 2001 (Argentinian crisis), 2008 (Lehman
Brothers collapse), and 2010-2011 (Eurozone crisis).
FIGURE 1 — VIX index of financial market volatility and periods of global crisis.
14Our safe-country classification is not dynamic, that is, if a country loses the double A rating for a short period of
time, it is not shifted in the non-safe group. We decided to adopt a non-dynamic criterion in order to avoid possible
issues of endogeneity. In this sense, one could argue that the current account balance is one of the aspects that
rating agencies take into account when determining a country’s rating. It should be noted that this is only one of
the many features that rating agencies declare to be considering in their evaluations (others being per capita income,
GDP growth, inflation, fiscal balance, external debt, the level of development), and that several empirical studies
did not find it to be a significant determinant of rating decisions. Yet, in order to be on the safe side and reduce a
possible endogeneity bias in our regression, we decided to adopt a static concept of safe country, thereby chosing not
to shift economies across different groups if their rating changes for a short period. On the other hand, the fact that
an economy might not be considered safe anymore in 2011, the year for which misalignments are computed, can be
easily taken into account when estimating CA imbalances.
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3.2 Empirical results
In order to study whether being a safe country is relevant for CA dynamics, and if this feature
assumes a special relevance in periods of global turmoil, we interact the safe-country and the
crisis dummies with other variables in the EBA baseline regression. Table 1 shows the results,
and compares our extended specification with the EBA. Results indicate significant differences in
external dynamics between different groups of countries, and between crisis periods and tranquil
times.
With respect to fiscal policy, as in the EBA, we find that a fiscal deficit tends to generate
a CA deficit in tranquil times, consistently with the so-called twin deficit hypothesis. However,
in crisis periods, this effect varies depending on the characteristics of the economies. Namely, in
countries that are not perceived as safe investment destinations, a fiscal expansion in turbulent
times translates into a lower external deficit. This seems to indicate that in these economies a fiscal
expansion in crisis periods could trigger a loss of confidence in financial markets participants and
imply a reduction in the availability of external financing. Safe economies, on the other hand, do
not seem to be subject to the same restrictions, as the impact of fiscal deficits on their external
accounts does not vary in crisis periods with respect to tranquil times.
In stable times, cyclical increases in demand tend to generate CA deficits. During crises, the
external positions of non-safe economies become more dependent on cyclical demand shocks. This
could be due to the fact that non-safe countries tend to be subject to financial retrenchment in
periods of global turbulence. The absence of external financing may contribute to make their ex-
ternal balances more dependent on internal demand shocks. The opposite holds for safe economies,
which tend to receive capital inflows in crises times due precisely to their characteristics of safe
assets producers, so that their CA fluctuations end up being less dependent on demand factors.
Not surprisingly, we find that the capacity of safe countries to attract investment is less depen-
dent on expected GDP growth, as signaled by the lower coefficient on forecasted output growth
estimated for this group of economies.
In the EBA the own currency’s share in world reserves, a proxy for countries’ "exorbitant
privilege", is found not to be significant. Once we distinguish between safe and non-safe countries,
we find that this coefficient is indeed very close to zero for safe economies, but it is instead negative,
and significantly so, for non-safe countries. This could indicate that economies that were not
considered by investors as safe investment destinations but ended up adopting a currency that
was used for reserve purposes (Portugal and Greece in our sample), could somehow increase their
credibility due to the international status of their currency, and were able to sustain higher external
deficits.
Some of our results are arguably due the different degree of development of safe economies
—by and large industrialized countries— and non-safe ones —typically emerging markets. In safe
industrialized countries the CA balance is much more affected by the aging speed, due to the
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higher average age of the population, which requires higher savings. In the EBA, health expenditure
is found to negatively affect the CA balance, as a low level of social protection typically boosts
precautionary savings. We find that in non-safe economies, by and large developing countries
characterized by a low level of social protection, health expenditure has a higher impact on external
balances. Consistently with the findings of Chinn and Prasad (2003), we also show that the impact
of relative per capita income, a proxy for the relative level of development, on external accounts is
much smaller for industrialized safe countries.15
EBA includes country dummies for Germany, Sweden and Malaysia. This is due to the fact
that the regression yields very large residuals for these economies. Country-dummies are therefore
introduced to mitigate a possible omitted-variable bias.16 It is interesting to notice that, once we
distinguish between country groups and crisis periods in our extended specification, the dummy
variable for Germany is not significant anymore. Also, the adjusted R-squared of our extended
specification is 5% higher than the one delivered by the EBA specification
Overall, our regression exercise suggests that safety aspects may be significant determinants of
external balances well beyond the role they are currently allowed to play in the EBA specification.
4 The impact of competitiveness on the current account balance
In order to select the competitiveness variables, we first consider the sectoral subindexes (pillars)
included in the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI), compiled by the World Economic Forum. One
interesting advantage of the GCI is that is constructed to define competitiveness beyond traditional
indicators of price competitiveness such as real exchange rate and unit labor costs fluctuations. The
twelve “pillars” of which it is composed —all factors that are widely accepted as being critical to
economic growth— may well boost competitiveness both by lowering firms’ production costs and
prices (what is usually known as price competitiveness) or by improving product quality (non-
price competitiveness). The index covers aspects such as the quality of institutions and education,
technological adoption, goods, labour, and financial markets efficiency and development.17 The
main problem with the GCI is its reduced time coverage (2006-2012), which prevents their use in
a complete econometric exercise like EBA. However, it is still possible to check which pillars are
more relevant in CA regressions, when considered jointly with the EBA variables. Results show
that the GCI pillars representing higher education, technological readiness and innovation are the
15We also found that the coefficient of the oil balance differs among safe and non-safe economies, with a much higher
impact estimated for non-safe countries than for safe ones. This seems to suggest that oil-exporting industrialized
countries may manage to invest more effectively oil proceedings domestically. Yet, it should be noted that estimating
a different oil balance coefficient for safe and non-safe countries amounts to discriminate only among two economies,
Russia and Norway, respectively the only non-safe and safe country with an oil trade balance higher than 10% of
GDP. Moreover the oil coefficient estimated this way produced a very high residual for Russia in 2011. For these
reasons, we ultimately decided not to introduce this distinction in the final version of our extended specification.
16Country dummies are used only for regression purposes. Their estimated coefficients are not included in the
calculation of CA norms. It should be also noticed that the second version of the EBA does not make use of any
country dummy.
17See see Schwab (2012) and Appendix B for further details on GCI indexes.
most significant ones, and increase the adjusted R-squared of EBA regressions.18
18The results of this exercise are shown in Table 6 in Appendix B. Also the GCI pillar reflecting financial develop-
ment enters significantly the EBA specification, while goods and labor market efficiency are not significant.
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Accordingly, we introduce in the EBA specification two new variables, reflecting, respectively,
higher education and technological progress.19 20 The proxy for the former is the share of the popu-
lation, older than 25, that completed upper tertiary studies. Data are from Barro and Lee (2010).21
We capture the effects of technological progress using Total Factor Productivity (TFP).22 Both ed-
ucation and TFP are expressed as deviations from a GDP-weighted world average, consistent with
the approach adopted in the EBA. For TFP, we also distinguish between safe and non-safe coun-
tries, following the classification introduced in the previous section. Finally, both variables enter
the regression in first differences. Table 2 shows the results of our extended specification.
Both the stock of human capital and technological progress are significant determinants of CA
balances, although the estimated coefficients are small, and these additions increase by less than
2% the explanatory power of the EBA regression.
The expected impact of productivity on the current account is, in principle, rather ambiguous
and dependent on other factors. Productivity improvements, especially in the tradable sector,
are likely to have a positive effect on price and non-price competitiveness and on current account
balance, although some minimum TFP threshold may be required as shown by Altomonte et al.
(2012). On the other hand, countries with higher or increasing productivity tend to experience
rising investment rates and current account deficits. In countries which are in the low stages
of development this is a fairly common experience, which may also be conditioned by aspects
such as financial development and business friendliness. In our empirical model the first effect is
captured in the case of the safest industrialized countries —those where a minimum productivity
threshold has been attained by a significant share of firms. In the less safe developing countries,
the negative effect through rising investment and lower savings —the anticipation of a higher stream
of future income prompts agents to bring forward consumption decisions— might be more relevant,
but still conditioned by each country financial development. This may explain why we do not find
a significant effect of productivity growth on their current account.
According to the theoretical literature, human capital plays an important role in determining
economic growth and competitiveness, but empirical studies have had strong difficulties to find
19More precisely, we consider both innovation and technology adoption to be part of technological progress.
20Recently, several works have shown that restricting the attention to indicators that have been traditionally used
to measure price competitiveness only, like unit labor costs or a country’s terms of trade, may be limiting. Altomonte
(2012), Dieppe et al. (2012) and Estrada et al. (2013) find that these measures of price competitiveness are only
imperfectly correlated with firms’ ability to operate in international markets and with countries’ export performance.
For these reasons we prefer not to use traditional indicators that measure exclusively price competitiveness. In order
to capture both the price and the non-price channel, we use instead proxies for technological progress and human
capital —factors that have been indicated as important determinants of firms’ export capacity and that may well act
both through a reduction in production costs and through an increase in product quality.
21Original data, which take the form of 5-years surveys, were interpolated using a spline function. See the data
appendix for additional details.
22For the methodology used to estimate TFP see Hall (1988) and Appendix C. See also Appendix A for a description
of the data used.
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convincing evidence for this. An exception is Altomonte et al. (2012) who find that the quality of
human resources is among those factors enhancing competitiveness at firm-level. We also find that
an increase in the share of the population with a tertiary level of education has a positive impact
on external surpluses. It is interesting to compare this result with the findings of Chinn and Prasad
(2000), even though roughly half of the developing economies in their sample is constituted by low-
income African countries, which are absent from our dataset. They proxy the human capital level
with a function of the average number of schooling years in the population. The negative impact
of education on current account balances that they find is likely to reflect the external financing
attracted by the higher productivity of capital that an additional year of education induces in
low-income countries. Our proxy of education is based instead on data on educational attainment
in upper tertiary studies, which reflects a highly specialized stock of human capital. Its impact on
current account balances is estimated to be positive, signaling that in industrialized and developing
countries a highly-specialized education can boost non-price competitiveness with positive effects
on external balances.
Safe countries, crisis periods and competitiveness
Extending the EBA specification with both the safe countries and crisis distinction, and compet-
itiveness factors yields very similar coefficients as those discussed above. Results are reported in
Table 3 (see Appendix D). Yet, three findings are worth noting. First, when introducing countries’
TFP, the different impact on external balances of relative income estimated for safe and non-safe
economies in Table 1, disappears.
Second, when controlling for TFP, significant differences in the impact of terms of trade fluc-
tuations among safe and non-safe countries in crisis times, emerge —differences similar to those
encountered for the cyclical demand shocks reflected in the output gap. Namely, while terms of
trade appreciations tend to generate CA surpluses in tranquil times as in the EBA, in periods of
global stress the dependence of the external balance on commodity price fluctuations gets more
pronounced for non-safe countries and less pronounced for safe economies.
A third finding to be noted is that allowing for a more comprehensive role of safety and compet-
itiveness drivers in CA regressions improves the overall fit of the econometric model with respect
to the EBA baseline. Namely, the adjusted R-squared of our extended specification is 9% higher
than the one delivered by the EBA baseline. Our modifications are particularly useful to reduce the
very large residuals that the EBA regressions yields for some countries. Figure 2, shows the Sum of
Squared Residuals for Poland, Portugal, Denmark, Sweden, Malaysia, Russia, Finland, Thailand
and Germany —among the countries for which the EBA regressions produces the largest residuals.
For several of these economies, the Sum of Squared Residuals delivered by the extended specification
is much lower than the one produced by the EBA baseline. A closer inspection, however, reveals
that the improved fit for high-residual countries in some years comes sometimes at the expenses of
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a worse fit in other time periods or for other economies. Figure 7 in the Appendix shows the CA
series and the fitted values obtained, respectively, through the EBA and the extended specification.
For 9 countries the extended specification yields a better fit for all the years considered, while for 3
economies the fit is worse along the whole time sample. For all the other countries, improvements
in some years seem to come at the expenses of a lower fit in other periods.
5 Estimating current account misalignments
Using the regression coefficients estimated with our extended specification and reported in Table 3,
we compute alternative CA misalignments for the year 2011 and compare them with those estimated
by the IMF through the EBA. In particular, we calculate a first measure of imbalances, which we
term "policy misalignment", using the distortions due to the four policy variables considered by
the EBA plus the regression residual. This first measure is the one that is directly comparable to
the imbalances estimated by the IMF. We then exploit the presence of competitiveness drivers to
estimate additional CA misalignments, due to more structural factors. These additional imbalances,
which we name “structural misalignments” reflect only distortions due to low progress in education
and technology adoption, and have no equivalent in the EBA analysis. The next sections report
our results for the two types of imbalances.
5.1 Policy misalignments
Policy misalignments are built using only the distortions due to the four policy variables considered
by the EBA plus the regression residual, and are therefore directly comparable to the misalignments
estimated by the IMF. From an operative point of view, the resulting CA misalignments are the
sum of the four policy gaps due to fiscal, health, capital controls and reserves policy, and the
residual for the year 2011. We take as optimal values for the four policy variables those provided
in the EBA dataset. Figure 3 shows the total CA misalignments estimated using our specification
and compares them with those computed through the EBA.
FIGURE 2 — Sum of Squared Residuals, selected countries.
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FIGURE 3 — Current account misalignments estimated for 2011, due to fiscal, health, capital controls and reserves policy distortions, plus the residual.
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The EBA analysis, reported and discussed in detail in the IMF External Sector Report (2012),
detects excessive CA surplus for several Asian economies. Within the EU, excessive surpluses are
detected for Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands, and are mostly due to the large residuals that
the econometric specification yields for these countries. Furthermore, most OECD countries exhibit
excessive CA deficits, mostly due to an excessively loose fiscal policy and to other unobservable
factors, reflected again in the residual.
Using the coefficients from our extended regression specification, we estimate larger misalign-
ments for countries like China, Japan, Korea, Italy, Spain and Malaysia, whereas we detect smaller
imbalances for Australia, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Turkey.
FIGURE 4 — Policy misalignments decomposition, selected countries.
Table 4 in the Appendix shows for all countries how much each of the four policy distortions
(policy gaps) and the regression residual relative to 2011 contribute to the estimated misalignments.
Figure 4 gives a graphical representation of the same decomposition for some selected economies.
For some Asian countries (China in the picture, but the findings extend to Malaysia as well)
we estimate a larger excessive surplus with respect to the one computed through the EBA, due
essentially to the more pronounced distortions caused by the inefficient health expenditure of these
countries and by their reserve accumulation policy. Indeed, when distinguishing among groups
of countries in CA regressions, we found that for non-safe economies, by and large developing
countries characterized by a low level of social protection, health expenditure has a stronger impact
on external balances. This implies that, in countries with an insufficient health expenditure that
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originates excessive savings and a surplus higher than the desirable one, this distortion acquires
more importance, and the external misalignment is larger than the one estimated through the EBA.
In the case of some industrialized countries —Japan in Figure 4— we compute higher misalign-
ments with respect to the EBA mainly because of two factors. The first is the smaller impact on
external balances of health expenditure, which we estimate for safe industrialized countries. This
leads to compute a smaller (positive) health policy gap. The second factor is a larger fiscal dis-
tortion. Indeed, using our extended specification we estimate that, for safe countries, the impact
of fiscal deficits on external balances is higher. Therefore, the effect of the fiscal policy gap for
economies like Japan, with an excessively lax fiscal policy in 2011, is larger than estimated by the
IMF.
In the case of Canada, we estimate a lower excessive deficit due to a less relevant health distortion
and to a smaller regression residual. The reduction in the residual, in turn, is due to the lower
estimated impact of commodity terms of trade fluctuations on the CA balance of safe countries
during periods of global stress. For economies that are heavily dependent on commodity exports
(Canada in the picture, but the findings extend to Australia as well), the lower sensitivity of external
balances to relative price fluctuations translates into a less positive CA norm for a year, like 2011,
in which the countries’ terms of trade are improving.
Finally, for a set of industrialized countries that exhibit large external surpluses —Germany in
the graph, but similar considerations also apply to Switzerland and the Netherlands— we estimate
a smaller external misalignment than the EBA, due essentially to a higher estimated "desirable"
surplus, which translates into a lower positive regression residual. There are mainly three reasons
for the higher desirable surplus estimated in 2011 for these countries. First, we find that in safe
industrialized economies, the aging speed of the population influences more the CA, as the high
average age of their population requires a higher level of savings. Second, these economies are
characterized by a high optimal health expenditure. This, according to the EBA regression results,
tends to imply an optimal external deficit. Since in our specification health expenditure has a
small impact on the external position for industrialized economies, we estimate their desirable
CA position to be less negative. Finally, these countries were characterized in 2011 by a large
demand (positive output gap), which, according to the EBA, tends to translate into an optimal
external deficit. In our specification, this factor is found to be less important for safe economies
in periods of global stress, and their desirable external position is computed to be less negative.
All these factors, together, imply that the desirable surplus for these countries in 2011 is higher
than estimated through the EBA, and their positive regression residual and external misalignments
lower. It should also be noted that in our specification the impact of fiscal deficits on external
balances is higher. This implies that a larger share of the external distortions estimated for EU
surplus countries is due to their relatively rigorous fiscal policy, as indicated by the grey area in
the graph. As all regressors are expressed relative to a world average, it should be emphasized that
this fiscal policy gap is not due to surplus countries’ own policies, but rather to the fiscal excesses
detected in other economies.
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Other interesting results concerning EU economies are reported in Table 4. Our results indicate
that the generous health policy implemented in France is not a cause of external imbalances,
contrary to what is estimated through the EBA. On the other hand, the Spanish fiscal policy,
which the IMF considers to have been too loose in 2011, might have a higher impact on external
imbalances.
5.2 Structural misalignments
In order to estimate the distortions due to a low progress in education and technology adoption,
we first need to establish desirable values for these variables. In a first approximation, we divide
countries according to their level of development and to their geographical area following the clas-
sification in Barro and Lee (2010). For each area we compute the average educational level (more
precisely, the average share of the 25+ population that has completed a tertiary degree) and the
average TFP level. If a country exhibits in 2011 values for these two variables that are above the
average, we assume that the change observed in 2011 is optimal. Otherwise, if an economy is below
the average, say, for education, we assume that the optimal change in the level of education in 2011
is the one that brings it in line with the group average.
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FIGURE 5 — Current account balances observed in 2011 and their structural norms.
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FIGURE 6 — Current account misalignments estimated for 2011, due to structural policy distortions.
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Figures 5 and 6 and, in the Appendix, Table 5 show the results. Figure 5 reports the CA/GDP
ratios observed in 2011, and the corresponding structural norms computed assuming that TFP
growth and educational attainments of all the countries are at their optimal level. We found for
several countries quantitatively important differences between observed external balances and their
desirable structural norms, in the order of 2% of GDP or more. Figure 6 ascribes these distortions
to different structural factors. External distortions due to an excessively low TFP level (relative
to the reference group of economies) are generally small.23 Only for Japan they seem to acquire
special relevance, consistently with the notion that TFP growth has lagged behind in this country
during its "lost decade". Several developing countries exhibit significant external imbalances due
to an insufficient level of high education. Among industrialized countries, this issue seems to be
particularly relevant for Italy and France.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper we study how current account dynamics differ between safe and non-safe economies,
focusing in particular on times of global stress. We also investigate how external dynamics are
influenced by factors that determine countries’ competitiveness. Our regression results show that
the impact of various determinants of external balances differs depending on whether the country
is perceived as a safe investment destination, and on whether the period is characterized by finan-
cial turmoil. We also find that competitiveness factors are among the significant drivers of the
current account for many countries. These results suggest that the method used by the IMF to
detect current account misalignments, the EBA, may not fully take into account safety aspects and
competitiveness factors as determinants of current account dynamics. Alternative misalignments
for 2011 computed through our extended specification, signal higher imbalances for Asian countries
and lower ones for some high-surplus advanced economies.
Interesting extensions to our framework could encompass investigating the role of countries’
level of development in driving external dynamics, endogenizing rating decisions through auxil-
iary regressions, determining optimal values for competitiveness variables from data on education
enrollment and from a model of technology diffusion, and considering the role of other, possibly
continuous proxies for safety (CDS spreads) and of other competitiveness factors (financial market
deepness, labor market flexibility).
23As in the EBA, variables are expressed in deviations from a world aggregate. Therefore positive gaps signal here
that a country does not have any domestic distortion due to a certain factor (for instance, because its educational
level is above its group average), but that other countries in the world do.
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A Data appendix
Most of our data are from the EBA Current Account database, publicly available at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/res/eba/data.htm.
Countries in the sample are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile,
China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Guatemala, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Mo-
rocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia,
Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, United
Kingdom, Uruguay, United States We refer the interested reader to a technical background note
on the EBA methodology for additional details on the variables
(see http://www.imf.org/external/np/res/eba/).
VIX/VXO index. In 1986 the Chicago Board Option Exchange (CBOE) began to estimate and,
from 1993, to publish, an index of financial market volatility known as VIX, based on the volatility
of a series of options of the S&P 100. In 2003 the methodology for its calculation was modified,
as the CBOE started using options to the S&P 500 to calculate the index. Still, the production of
the "old" VIX, based on the S&P 100, continued, under the label VXO. This the the index that is
included in the baseline EBA regression to proxy for changes in risk aversion, and the one we use
to identify periods of global stress. We use the "old" VIX concept in order to avoid inconsistencies
due to the methodological change.
Educational attainment data are from Barro and Lee (2010). The Barro and Lee (2010) cross-
country data on educational attainment are based on census and survey information, as compiled
by UNESCO, Eurostat and other sources. These figures report the distribution of educational
attainment in the population over age 15 by sex and by 5-year age group. In Barro and Lee
(2010) only population aged 25 and over and four levels of education are considered: (i) no formal
education; (ii) primary; (iii) secondary; and (iv) tertiary. Missing observations are filled in by
forward and backward extrapolation of the census/survey observations on attainment. The basic
idea used is that the mean educational level of a given 25+ cohort remains constant over time
under certain assumptions. Then attainment shares can be moved back and forth over time to t-5
and t+5. This procedure is adjusted by considering different mortality rates by education level for
the 65+ cohorts. Barro and Lee (2010) provide two main measures of educational attainment: (a)
the share of 25+ population that attained a given level of education [(i) to (iv)] as the highest;
and (b) the average years of schooling of 25+ population. They also provide figures for the share
of population which completed a given level of education. The variable included in the regressions
(“tertiary education” in Table 2 and 3) is the share of 25+ population with tertiary education
completed. Original data, which take the form of 5-years surveys, were interpolated using a spline
function.
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in Barro and Lee (2010), we divide countries according to their level of development and their
geographical area, into:
Advanced economies: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Korea, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal,
Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States.
Latin America: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru,
Uruguay.
East Asia: China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand.
East EU and Central Asia: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Russia.
Others: Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka.
B Selecting competitiveness factors
In order to select the most promising competitiveness variables, a first glance was taken at the
sectoral subindexes (pillars) included in the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI), compiled by the
World Economic Forum. One interesting advantage of the GCI is that is constructed to define
competitiveness beyond real exchange rate movements. The GCI is composed by twelve “pillars”,
all of which are widely accepted as being critical to economic growth. Using a combination of
publicly available quantitative data and information provided in the Forum’s Executive Opinion
Survey (qualitative aspects), these pillars are brought together into the index. The index covers
aspects such as the quality of the macroeconomic environment; the state of a country’s public
and private institutions; the increasing importance of technology in the development process; a
country’s technological readiness, the extent to which the country has a well-developed transport
and communications infrastructure network; the quality of education as evaluated by the business
community as well as staff’s training as a proxy for workers’ skills. More importantly, the index
also covers goods, labour, and financial markets efficiency and development. These indexes can
reach a value between 1 and 7, with 1 being the worst and 7 the best.
The main problem with the GCI is its reduced time coverage (2006-2012), which prevents their
use in a complete econometric exercise of this type. However, it is still possible to check which
pillars are more relevant (if any) in current account regressions when considered jointly with the
EBA variables. The results of this exercise are summarised in Table 6.
Country groupings used to compute benchmarks for structural competitiveness policies. As
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C TFP estimation
Data used as a proxy for total factor productivity (TFP) were obtained as in Estrada (2009). They
are estimates based on the Solow residual —the difference between output growth and a weighted
average of the growth rates of labour and capital, being the weights the income participation of those
inputs in the production-. As shown in the seminal paper by Hall (1988), under the assumption of
imperfect competition in product markets, the Solow residual captures not only changes in TFP
but also in the capital stock and mark-ups. Therefore, to obtain a proxy for TFP some previous
knowledge on mark-ups is needed. The approach followed is the same as in Estrada (2009), which
obtains estimates of mark-ups for several countries and economic sectors under the assumption they
can change over time. By applying Kalman filter techniques and a two-step approach, similar to
Kim (2006), we deal with the time-varying nature of mark-ups and the need of using instruments to
appropriately estimate changes in total factor productivity through the Solow residual. Production
data are form the EBA database and labour data from the World Bank database. Capital stock
data were obtained by adding cumulated investment to initial capital conditions provided by United
Nations Industrial Development Organisation.24
24See http://www.unido.org/data1/wpd/Index.cfm.
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FIGURE 7a — Observed CA/GDP ratio, EBA fit and extended regression fit.
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FIGURE 7b — Observed CA/GDP ratio, EBA fit and extended regression fit.
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FIGURE 7c — Observed CA/GDP ratio, EBA fit and extended regression fit.
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FIGURE 7d — Observed CA/GDP ratio, EBA fit and extended regression fit.
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FIGURE 7e — Observed CA/GDP ratio, EBA fit and extended regression fit.
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